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WHAT MAKES FOR MORE OR LESS POWERFUL
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS?
STEPHEN GARDBAUM*
It is sometimes suggested that one or another constitutional or supreme
court (for example, the U.S., Indian, or German) is the “most powerful in
the world.” And yet it is often far from clear what the measure of power is
or should be, what the sources of judicial power are under the given
measure, and what explains why some courts are more powerful than others.
Is strength mostly a function of formal powers, so that, for example, a court
with the authority to invalidate a constitutional amendment on substantive
grounds is ipso facto more powerful than one that may only invalidate
statutes, which in turn is more powerful than a court that can do neither?
Yet, both the U.S. and Japanese supreme courts are in this middle category;
indeed they have roughly similar sets of legal powers overall, but while the
former is often considered among the most powerful courts in the world, the
latter is often considered among the weakest. Thus, it seems clear that
formal powers do not tell the whole story, but what part do they play, if any,
and what else helps to fill in the picture? Although looking to how courts
actually use their legal powers is obviously also relevant, it too falls short.
For what we are additionally in search of are factors that help to explain
why, for example, the U.S. and Japanese courts use their powers in such
different ways.
This Article seeks to shed light on all three parts of the uncertainty: the
measure; sources; and explanation of judicial power. It begins by proposing
that the proper measure of the power of a constitutional court is its
consequential nature as an institutional actor in terms of affecting the
outcomes of important constitutional and political issues. Although more
diffuse and harder to quantify, this conception of judicial power is more
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inclusive and realistically nuanced than commonly employed unidimensional alternatives, such as international influence or strike-down
rate. The Article next argues that the consequential nature of a
constitutional court is a function of three broad variables: formal rules and
powers, legal and judicial practice, and the immediate electoral and
political context in which it operates. Through a process of mutual
interaction, each of these three helps to shape and constitute the more
specific components of a court’s institutional power, which include the
nature, scope, and content of the constitution it enforces, the jurisdictional
and remedial powers it has and employs, the ease or difficulty of
constitutional amendment, and its composition and tenure. Moving from
measuring to explaining the strength or weakness of constitutional courts,
the Article next identifies and discusses three explanatory variables:
deliberate constitutional design choices, legal culture, and general or
structural political context. The Article concludes with case studies of the
supreme courts of India and Japan that illustrate the role and interaction of
these multidimensional evidentiary and explanatory factors.
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I. INTRODUCTION
It is sometimes suggested that one or another constitutional or supreme
court—for example, the Indian,1 U.S.,2 or German3—is the “most powerful
in the world.” And yet it is far from clear (a) what such power or “strength”
of courts consists in; i.e., what measure, metric, criterion, conception, test,
or indicia of power or strength is (usually implicitly) employed,4 (b) what
the sources or components of judicial power are under the given measure,
and (c) what explains why some courts are more powerful than others. Is
strength exclusively or mostly a function of formal legal powers, so that, for
example, a court with the authority to invalidate a constitutional amendment
on substantive grounds is ipso facto more powerful than one that may only
invalidate statutes, which in turn is more powerful than a court that can do
neither? Yet, both the U.S. and Japanese supreme courts are in this middle
category; indeed they have roughly similar sets of legal powers overall, but
while the former is often considered among the most powerful courts in the
world, the latter is often considered among the weakest.5 Thus, it seems clear
that formal powers do not tell the whole story, but what part do they play, if
any, and what else helps to fill in the picture? Although looking to how
courts actually use their legal powers is obviously also relevant, it too falls
short of fully completing the picture. For what we are additionally in search
of are factors that help to explain why, for example, the U.S. and Japanese
courts use their powers in such different ways.
This Article seeks to shed light on all three uncertainties surrounding
claims as to the overall strength or weakness of constitutional courts: the
1. Clark D. Cunningham, The World’s Most Powerful Court: Finding the Roots of India’s Public
Interest Litigation Revolution in the Hussainara Khatoon Prisoners Case, in LIBERTY, EQUALITY AND
JUSTICE: STRUGGLES FOR A NEW SOCIAL ORDER 83–96 (S.P. Sathe ed., 2003); S.P. Sathe, Judicial
Activism: The Indian Experience, 6 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 29, 87 (2001) (“The Supreme Court of India
has become the most powerful apex court in the world.”).
2. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR
OF POLITICS 1 (2d ed. 1962) (“The least dangerous branch of the American government is the most
extraordinarily powerful court of law the world has ever known.”).
3. Peter E. Quint, The Most Extraordinarily Powerful Court of Law the World has Ever Known?
– Judicial Review in the United States and Germany, 65 MD. L. REV. 152, 153 (2006) (“[T]he
contemporary observer might well ask whether the German Constitutional Court has surpassed the
American Supreme Court — as well as other possible contenders — to become ‘the most extraordinarily
powerful court of law the world has ever known.’”).
4. See, e.g., Daniel M. Brinks & Abby Blass, Rethinking Judicial Empowerment: The New
Foundations of Constitutional Justice, 15 INT’L J. CONST. L. 296, 321 (2017) (“[T]here is no consensus
on the concept or the measure of judicial power.”); Tom Ginsburg et al., Judicial Review in New
Democracies: Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases, 3 NTU L. REV. 143 (2008).
5. See, e.g., David Law, The Anatomy of a Conservative Court: Judicial Review in Japan, in
PUBLIC LAW IN EAST ASIA (Albert H.Y. Chen & Tom Ginsburg eds., 2013); Shigenori Matsui, Why is
the Japanese Supreme Court So Conservative?, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1375 (2011).
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measure; components; and explanation of judicial power. The first two of
these in combination address the question of whether, for example, the
Supreme Court of India has become more powerful since the 1980s and, if
so, the third addresses why this is the case. What accounts for this increase?
In other words, this first question looks to evidentiary factors and the second
to explanatory ones.
The Article begins (in Part II) by canvassing various possible criteria,
measures or tests of judicial power, suggesting that the consequential nature
of a constitutional court in terms of affecting the outcomes of important
constitutional and political disputes is the most plausible one, and ironing
out a few wrinkles to try and get the most out of it. Part III argues that the
consequential nature of a constitutional court is a function of three broad
categories or types of variables: (1) formal rules and powers; (2) legal and
judicial practice; and (3) the immediate political and electoral context in
which it operates. As we shall see, the second and third categories can and
do both increase and reduce judicial power relative to the first. Through a
process of mutual interaction, each of these three helps to shape and
constitute the more specific components of a court’s institutional power,
which include the nature, scope, and content of the constitution it enforces,
the jurisdictional and remedial powers it has and employs, the ease or
difficulty of constitutional amendment, and its composition and tenure.
In Part IV, the Article moves from measuring to explaining the strength
or weakness of constitutional courts. Unlike in Parts II and III, here we are
looking not for evidence of power or strength, but rather for explanations of
the evidence found; not (to reuse the above example) to see whether the U.S.
and Japanese courts use their powers in very different ways, but why. The
explanatory variables identified and discussed are: (1) deliberate
constitutional design choices; (2) legal culture; and (3) the more general
political structure within which a court operates. In both Parts III and IV, it
will be argued it is the interaction of the various factors that does most of the
evidentiary and explanatory work. Moreover, because these factors are not
fixed but change over time, so too does the relative power of the courts they
help to identify and explain. In Part V, the Article provides case studies of
the Supreme Courts of India and Japan that illustrate the role and interaction
of these multidimensional evidentiary and explanatory factors.
II. MEASURES OF THE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS
When commentators claim that one or another court is among the most
powerful in the world, they typically rely—implicitly or explicitly—on one
or more indicia of strength that it will be useful to separate. The first of these
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is international influence, as evidenced by, inter alia, the borrowing of its
constitutional work product by other apex courts, discussion or citation of its
judgments by courts, policymakers, and scholars, and/or their reproduction
in comparative constitutional textbooks and other materials. For example,
by this measure, a good case can be made for the strength of the German
Federal Constitutional Court, given in particular the adoption of both its
proportionality analysis and doctrine of the indirect horizontal effect of
constitutional rights by many national and international courts around the
world in recent decades.6 By contrast, the influence of the U.S. Supreme
Court abroad has declined significantly since the end of the Warren Court
era,7 when Bickel made his well-known claim.8 Yet it is far from clear that,
overall, the modern U.S. court is any less powerful than its predecessor. In
other words, this measure is too externally focused to serve as a reliable or
accurate sole criterion.
A second measure of strength is “judicial activism,” in this context
referring to the number, frequency, or percentage of cases in which
constitutional courts exercise their powers of judicial review against the
government of the day, especially where this involves invalidating
legislation.9
For example, during the 1990s the new Hungarian
Constitutional Court was estimated to have struck down approximately onethird of all statutes that it reviewed,10 leading to it being considered a
particularly powerful court,11 at least before “its wings were clipped”12 by
Prime Minister Viktor Orban, first at the end of that decade by his
replacement of its chief justice and more comprehensively after he returned
to power with a supermajority in 2010. The French Conseil constitutionnel
6. On the spread of proportionality analysis from Germany, see Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews,
Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 72 (2008). On
indirect horizontal effect, see e.g., MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW
AND SOCIAL WELFARE RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 196 (2008) (“The German
Constitutional Court’s decision in the case of Erich Lüth [establishing the doctrine of indirect horizontal
effect] has been enormously influential.”).
7. David Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United States Constitution, 87
N.Y.U. L. REV. 762, 768 (2012).
8. See BICKEL, supra note 2.
9. On the complexities of defining and comparing “judicial activism,” see Nuno Garoupa,
Comparing Judicial Activism – Can we Say that the US Supreme Court is more Activist than the German
Constitutional Court?, 72 REVISTA PORTUGUESA DE FILOSOFIA 1089 (2016).
10. See Kim Lane Scheppele, Democracy by Judiciary (Or, why Courts Can be More Democratic
than Parliaments), in RETHINKING THE RULE OF LAW AFTER COMMUNISM 25, 44 (Adam Czarnota et al.
eds., 2005).
11. See Jon Elster, On Majoritarianism and Rights, 1 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 19, 22 (1992)
(characterizing the Court as “the most powerful constitutional court in the world”).
12. Kim Lane Scheppele, The New Hungarian Constitutional Court, 8 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 81, 87
(1999).
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had an even higher rate of finding challenged legislation unconstitutional in
whole or part even before 2010,13 when its jurisdictional limitations might
otherwise have made it seem weaker than most other modern constitutional
courts.14 Using the same metric but on the other side of the ledger, the
“weakness” or “conservatism” of the Japanese Supreme Court is standardly
evidenced by citing the statistic that since 1947 it has only found eight
statutes unconstitutional, in whole or in part.15 Similarly with Scandinavian
supreme courts.16 By contrast, courts often perceived as among the most
powerful in the world have far lower invalidation rates than the Hungarian
court of the 1990s or the French Conseil—on average approximately one
federal statute every two years by the U.S. Supreme Court, five per year in
the first 17 years of the South African Court, and nine per year by the German
Court since its inception in 1951.17 Accordingly, such activism appears to
be neither a necessary nor a sufficient measure of power.
A third criterion is a more nuanced and broader-gauged, but less easily
quantified, conception of the power of a constitutional courts that focuses on
how consequential an actor it is in terms of affecting the outcomes of
important constitutional and political issues; that is, its actual impact on
social and political outputs.18 This criterion takes into account the various
roles that constitutional courts play and the concrete differences their
decisions make, as well as their gravitational pull on other political actors
and processes even without their overt intervention.19 So, for example, by
13. See VÍCTOR FERRERES COMELLA, CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AND DEMOCRATIC VALUES 84
(2009) (reporting that “around half its decisions have found the challenged provisions to be totally or
partially unconstitutional”); Louis Favoreu, The Constitutional Council and Parliament in France, in
CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW AND LEGISLATION: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 95 (Christine
Landfried ed., 1988) (“the proportion of nullification compared to the total number of cases decided is
undoubtedly higher in France than in other countries”).
14. Prior to the constitutional amendment in 2010, the Conseil had no “concrete review”
jurisdiction from other courts and could only exercise “abstract review” prior to the promulgation of a
statute.
15. See, e.g., Law, supra note 5, at 1547; Matsui supra note 5, at 1388. See also SHIGENORI
MATSUI, THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 147 (2011).
16. See, e.g., Ran Hirschl, The Nordic Counternarrative: Democracy, Human Development, and
Judicial Review, 9 INT’L J. CONST. L. 449, 450–51 (2011) (citing, inter alia, the fact that the Danish
Supreme Court has invalidated statutes only once in 160 years as evidence that “the Nordic model of
judicial review . . . is the true, genuine weak-form judicial review”).
17. Aileen Kavanagh, Situating the Strike-Down 3–4 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author).
18. See COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLICY, CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS: JUDICIAL
ROLES IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (Diana Kapiszewski, Gordon Silverstein & Robert A. Kagan eds., 2013)
(taking this general approach). See also Brinks & Blass, supra note 4, at 297–98.
19. See, e.g., Alec Stone, Abstract Constitutional Review and Policy Making in Western Europe,
in COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW AND PUBLIC POLICY (D. Jackson & C.N. Tate eds., 1992) (focusing
on the interaction between courts and political institutions in establishing policy).
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this measure the extraordinary role that the Colombian Constitutional Court
has played in that country’s peace process and agreement is a manifestation
of its institutional power,20 regardless of how this is viewed elsewhere or
whether it upholds or invalidates the resulting document.
Overall, it seems appropriate that in identifying the indicia of power
among constitutional courts, we should employ more or less the same ones
that apply to the other political actors in a system; in the first instance it is
their power relative to these actors that is being assessed, and only then is
the power of courts being compared inter se. For when we say that Court A
is more powerful than Court B, what we mean (or should mean), I think, is
that Court A is more powerful within its constitutional system than Court B
is in its own. It is also unclear why power should be conceptualized
differently if, or just because, we are focusing on courts rather than, for
example, executives or legislatures. Accordingly, this general political
science conception of power or strength seems to be the proper starting point,
and perhaps also reflects the intuitive or implicit measure underlying certain
common ascriptions of strength (such as the U.S. Supreme Court) better than
the other two measures previously considered.
One aspect of this conception, however, arguably needs to be refined to
the extent it insists that political power is the ability to impose one’s will on
other actors and institutions.21 For insofar as political scientists and others
have persuasively argued that courts have, in some contexts and for various
reasons, been empowered by the other political branches themselves,22 it
seems perverse to claim that where politicians are happy, and prefer, to
delegate constitutional issues to courts, this cannot be said to increase
judicial power. For example, it is widely understood that one key factor in
the rise of modern executives at the expense of legislatures around the world
has been the delegation of lawmaking authority to the former by the latter

20. See MANUEL JOSÉ CEPEDA ESPINOSA & DAVID LANDAU, COLOMBIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
LEADING CASES 226–40 (2017). Most recently, the court upheld the constitutional amendments
incorporating the peace agreement into the constitution and prohibiting any change to the agreement for
three presidential cycles, or 12 years.
21. This is Robert Dahl’s influential conception. See Robert A. Dahl, The Concept of Power, 2
BEHAV. SCI. 201 (1957).
22. See, e.g., TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL
COURTS IN ASIAN CASES 65–66 (2003); RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND
CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 38–49 (2004); KEITH WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY xi–xii (2007); infra note 119.
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for various reasons.23 And yet, we do not thereby conclude that this cannot
be said to increase the political power of executives.
One criterion that is not a test of the overall power or strength or
weakness of a constitutional court is the distinction between “strong-form”
and “weak-form” judicial review.24 This distinction refers primarily to a
narrower and more particular constitutional design choice in
institutionalizing judicial review—whether or not legislatures are legally
empowered to respond to specific judicial review decisions within the
existing constitution (i.e., without amending it)—and is not claimed or
intended to provide a single metric for the overall or all-things-considered
strength or weakness of courts.25 These are simply two distinct issues,
notwithstanding that both make use of the terms “strong” and “weak.”26 As
I shall explain in the next part, this design choice may be one factor among
many that can affect the overall power or weakness of a constitutional court;
but it is not—and was never claimed to be—the only or major criterion.
III. MEASURING HOW CONSEQUENTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL
COURTS ARE
If we accept that the best or most useful conception of a constitutional
court’s overall power or strength is not its international influence or the
percentage of its judgments that find against the government of the day, but
rather its more diffuse status as a consequential political actor within a
(domestic or transnational) constitutional order, then the key question
23. See, e.g., B. Dan Wood, Congress and the Executive Branch: Delegation and Presidential
Dominance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS (George C. Edwards III, Frances
E. Lee & Eric Schickler eds., 2011) (highlighting the increase of executive action due to the organizational
structures of the executive branch, the rise of the administrative state, the power of agenda setting, and
lack of technical skills by Congress).
24. See Mark Tushnet, Alternative Forms of Judicial Review, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2781, 2802 (2003)
(introducing the terminology of “weak-form” versus “strong-form” judicial review).
25. Id. at 2782–86. The “strong-form/weak-form” distinction does not even signify the only way
that judicial review can be said to be strong or weak, much less the overall institutional power of a
constitutional court more generally. On the “multidimensional” factors determining the strength or
weakness of judicial review, see TAMAS GYORFI, AGAINST THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 216–51
(2016) (identifying the scope and intensity of judicial review, in addition to its finality).
26. A third distinct issue in the literature utilizing the language of strength and weakness is the
character of particular exercises of judicial review, particularly with respect to remedies. Thus, choosing
to employ the remedy of a suspended, rather than an immediate, declaration of invalidity is sometimes
said to be a “weaker” or more “dialogical” exercise of a court’s powers, although this characterization
has been contested. See Robert Leckey, The Harms of Remedial Discretion, 14 INT’L J. CONST. L. 584,
584–86 (2016). Similarly, the original 1954 Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (“Brown I”), declaring the unconstitutionality of racially segregated schools,
has been contrasted with the “weaker” decision a year later in Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S.
753, 757 (1955) (“Brown II”), giving states significant remedial discretion by requiring them to
desegregate “with all deliberate speed.”
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becomes: what determines this status? What are the sources and components
of judicial power that make some constitutional courts strong or significant
institutional actors relative to the other branches within their system of
government, and others weak, with far less impact on constitutionally
relevant policy outcomes? The answer, I suggest, is a function of three broad
variables: (1) formal rules and powers, (2) legal and judicial practice, and (3)
the immediate political and electoral context in which the court operates. In
arguing for the importance, and interaction, of all three, I am self-consciously
resisting the twin perspectives that formal powers determine everything and
nothing about inter-branch relations and constitutional politics.
In a recent article, Daniel Brinks and Abby Blass have proposed that
judicial power is properly measured by the interaction of three formal
institutional design choices: (1) the extent of a court’s “ex ante autonomy,”
or freedom from external control before the judges are seated, which is a
function of the number of actors involved in the formal process of judicial
appointment; (2) its “ex post autonomy” or freedom from means of punishing
or rewarding judges after appointment; and (3) the scope of its authority in
terms of jurisdiction, accessibility, and remedial powers.27 Thus, courts
granted greater combined formal autonomy and authority will be more
powerful than courts with less. As a way of conceptualizing and measuring
judicial power, this strikes me as a very helpful contribution, especially in
terms of breaking down the diffuse idea of a consequential court into its more
concrete constitutive parts. But, as the authors readily concede, “actual
judicial power is not simply a function of institutional design”28 and
“whether and how courts use their formal power is contingent upon several
variables”29 beyond the scope of their analysis. So, by looking to the role of
legal practice and political context in filling in this more complete picture,
albeit in a schematic way, I aim to suggest and illustrate the most important
other variables. However, seemingly contra Brinks and Blass, these other
factors do not only play a role in whether, when, and to what extent courts
choose to exercise their measure of power. This is because the autonomy
and authority of constitutional courts themselves are partly constituted by
legal practice and political context, and are not exclusively a matter of formal
institutional design.
For example, as we will see, neither the
impartiality/independence of the judicial appointments process nor the

27. Brinks & Blass, supra note 4, at 299. For Brinks & Blass, ex post autonomy is a function of the
number of veto players in the removal process, the length of judicial tenure, and whether there is
constitutional protection against court-packing, jurisdiction stripping, and monetary pressures on the
court. Id. at 307–11.
28. Id. at 304.
29. Id.
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jurisdiction, accessibility, and powers of constitutional courts are necessarily
fixed by initial design choices but can and do vary with context and over
time without changes in formal authority. Moreover, autonomy and
authority are sometimes taken by constitutional courts in the course of their
practice rather than granted by institutional designers. Accordingly, the
following tripartite division does not neatly or simply map onto a distinction
between the possession and use of a formal legal power. In other words,
with autonomy and authority, as with so much else, there is a gap between
form and substance.
A. Formal Powers
Among the important questions of legal or formal authority affecting
the overall institutional role and political power of the courts in any system
are the following:
(1) Does the country have a written or codified constitution, or a bill of
rights with constitutional status, that one or more courts are empowered to
enforce in a non-minimal way? As Tocqueville was perhaps the first to state
explicitly, judicial review of legislation is, in and of itself, a significant
political power of the courts.30
(2) What is the scope of such a constitution? Does it regulate a wide
range of actors and activities in that society (at the extreme, a so-called “total
constitution”31) or a relatively narrow range, perhaps limited to creating the
governing institutions and ground rules of political engagement, and a
handful of defensive or negative rights against the state? Is the constitution
in question a transformative one, thereby tasking all public officials,
including the judiciary, with bringing about fundamental change in the
political society?32
30. “So an American judge is exactly like the magistrates of other countries. Nevertheless, he is
invested with immense political power. How does this come about? . . . The reason lies in this one fact:
the Americans have given their judges the right to base their decisions on the Constitution rather than on
the laws. In other words, they allow them not to apply laws which they consider unconstitutional.” ALEXIS
DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 100–01 (J.P. Mayer ed., Harper & Row 1969) (1835). As
Aileen Kavanagh has urged, one should not, as perhaps Tocqueville did, overstate the importance of the
“strike down” power relative to other remedial powers of constitutional review, including the power to
modify incompatible statutes through interpretation; but (as she also urges) one should not underestimate
it either. See Kavanagh, supra note 17, at 17.
31. Mattias Kumm, Who is Afraid of the Total Constitution? Constitutional Rights as Principles
and the Constitutionalization of Private Law, 7 GERMAN L.J. 341 (2006).
32. See Dirk Kotzé, Constitutionalism and Democratic Transitions: Lessons from South Africa, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS: LESSONS FROM SOUTH AFRICA 81, 83 (Veronica
Federico & Carlo Fusaro eds., 2006) (“The Constitution therefore clearly visualizes itself as a transitional
and transformational instrument: one involved in political and social engineering.”); see also Micheala
Hailbronner, Transformative Constitutionalism: Not Only in the Global South, 65 AM. J. COMP. L. 527
(2017).
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(3) How specific or general are its provisions; i.e., how much scope for
judicial interpretation does it contain? At the extreme, a self-interpreting
constitution would mostly be self-enforcing. At the same time, the more
detail a constitution contains (for example, concerning the legislative process
and/or constitutional obligations), the greater license it may provide for
legitimate judicial intervention.33
(4) Are courts granted strong or weak-form powers of judicial review?34
Although undoubtedly courts with strong-form powers may be weak
political actors overall and vice-versa,35 because this is only one factor
among the many that are relevant, it is probably not purely coincidental that
the courts most frequently perceived as among the most powerful all have
strong-form powers; i.e., legislatures in these countries are not legally
empowered to respond to constitutional court decisions by ordinary majority
vote.
(5) What remedial powers do the courts possess?
Whether
constitutional courts have been empowered to invalidate statutes that are
incompatible with the constitution, to issue suspended declarations of
invalidity, advisory opinions, and/or non-legally binding declarations of
incompatibility, to modify/reinterpret incompatible statutes and to what
extent, and/or to order damages for, or enjoin, constitutional violations are
important variables in the nature and type of interbranch relations that exist
and are possible on constitutional issues.36
(6) How onerous or flexible are the formal constitutional amendment
rules? This is one factor, although to be sure not the only one,37 in
determining how easy or difficult it is in practice to overrule a constitutional

33. For example, I have argued that a recent series of extraordinary interventions by the South
African Constitutional Court reviewing internal legislative proceedings (as distinct from legislative acts)
is to be explained in part by the comparatively detailed and extensive textual provisions in the
Constitution dealing with the legislature’s functions, processes, and especially obligations. See Stephen
Gardbaum, Judicial Review of Legislative Procedures in South Africa 11–14 (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author).
34. See supra text accompanying notes 24–25.
35. See Mark Tushnet & Rosalind Dixon, Weak-Form Review and its Constitutional Relatives: An
Asian Perspective, in ROSALIND DIXON & TOM GINSBURG, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN
ASIA 113–14 (2014); Aileen Kavanagh, What’s So Weak About “Weak-Form Review”? The Case of the
Human Rights Act 1998, 13 INT’L J. CONST. L. 1008, 1030–36 (2015); Kavanagh, supra note 17, at 16–
17.
36. See ROBERT LECKEY, BILLS OF RIGHTS IN THE COMMON LAW 30–31 (2015) (emphasizing the
general importance of focusing on the various remedial powers of constitutional courts).
37. See Tom Ginsburg & James Melton, Does the Constitutional Amendment Rule Matter at All?
Amendment Cultures and the Challenges of Measuring Amendment Difficulty, 13 INT’L J. CONST. L. 686,
699 (2015).
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court by constitutional amendment;38 the easier it is, ceteris paribus, the less
powerful a constitutional court is likely to be.
(7) Are courts empowered to review not only statutes and
administrative actions for constitutionality, but also the substance of
constitutional amendments? Where they are, things are not ceteris paribus,
and this adds a further layer of complexity, as we shall see in more detail in
the Indian case study. The judicial power to declare constitutional
amendments substantively unconstitutional has been referred to as “superstrong” judicial review39 and the basis for a “truly supreme” judiciary.”40
(8) What is the jurisdiction of the constitutional/supreme court, what
types of claims can it hear, and can the political branches reduce it? Is the
power of judicial review centralized in a specialist constitutional court,
which may have incentives to exercise its only (or major) function more
robustly than a multi-functional or generalist apex court in a decentralized
system?41
(9) In terms of “standing” rules, how accessible is the court? May
ordinary citizens petition it? Do politicians have relatively easy or difficult
access? The harder it is to get through its door, the less opportunity a court
has to exercise its power and jurisdiction.
(10) How are constitutional judges appointed? Is their appointment
controlled by existing members of the judiciary (for example, the
“collegium” system in India), by an independent commission, by voters via
election,42 by the executive or legislature alone, or is the approval of both
branches required? What is the voting rule for appointment to the court on
the part of the appointing body: a simple majority of members or a
supermajority? Ceteris paribus, a supermajority requirement is likely to
result in the appointment of different, more consensual, selections.43 How
many judicial vacancies arise at the same time and how frequently they arise
are also likely to affect the constitutional politics of selection.44

38. See Rosalind Dixon & Adrienne Stone, Constitutional Amendment and Political
Constitutionalism: A Philosophical and Comparative Reflection, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 95, 95–97 (David Dyzenhaus & Malcolm Thorburn eds., 2016).
39. See Rosalind Dixon & David Landau, Transnational Constitutionalism and a Limited Doctrine
of Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment, 13 INT’L J. CONST. L. 606, 611 (2015).
40. Richard Albert, How a Court Becomes Supreme: Defending the Constitution from
Unconstitutional Amendments, 77 MD. L. REV. 181, 182–83 (2017).
41. See Victor Ferreres Comella, The Consequences of Centralizing Constitutional Review in a
Special Court: Some Thoughts on Judicial Activism, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1730–31 (2004).
42. As currently in Bolivia.
43. See John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, Constitutional Adjudication: Lessons from Europe,
82 TEX. L. REV. 1671, 1702 (2004).
44. Id.
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(11) What is their tenure? Are constitutional court judges appointed for
life, with or without a mandatory retirement age, or for a renewable or
nonrenewable fixed term? How long is that term? Do judges have to worry
about reappointment or their post-judicial employment prospects?
(12) Relatedly, where they do have reason to worry, are the judgments
of the court required to be anonymous and unattributable, or individualized?
Are concurrences or dissents permitted?
Apart from a completely sham constitutional system in which formal
powers bear no or very little relation to political realities, it is hard to imagine
that if a constitutional system were to answer these twelve questions45 by
granting the maximalist legal powers to its constitutional court, these would
not convert into the currency of “actual political power” vis-à-vis the other
political institutions in that system. Similarly, a judiciary with few formal
powers, such as that in China, is highly unlikely to have much political power
in practice. In between these poles, more typically, legal powers will be an
important but often not sufficient factor by which to ascribe or predict
strength. Two courts might have broadly similar formal powers across many
or all of these factors, as for example the U.S. and Japanese supreme courts,
and yet be very different in terms of actual or de facto judicial power. At the
very least, the differences in judicial power may be far greater than, and not
closely correspond with, any differences in formal powers. Similarly, a
single constitutional court might become significantly more or less powerful
over time or in a given time period without changes in its formal powers, as
the examples of the U.S. and Indian supreme courts suggest.
B. Legal and Judicial Practice
The second broad category of factors that must be taken into account
as a source and component of the power of a constitutional court is legal and
judicial practice. Obviously whether, how, and when the different
substantive and remedial legal powers of the judiciary canvassed in the
previous section (as well as any responsive powers of the political branches)
are actually used will be highly relevant to measuring the actual overall
strength or weakness of courts in the respective jurisdictions. A court that
never uses its formal powers or invariably practices deference towards the
decisions it is reviewing cannot be considered a strong or powerful court and
is likely to be less so than a court that more robustly employs the lesser or
45. Of these twelve questions, the first part of number ten corresponds with Brinks and Blass’ factor
of ex ante autonomy, number eleven with ex post autonomy, and (I believe) numbers five, eight and nine
with their third factor of “authority.” See Brinks & Blass, supra note 27 and accompanying text. In
addition, numbers one, two, and six overlap in part with Gyorfi’s factor of the “scope of judicial review”
and number four with its “finality.” See GYORFI, supra note 25.
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fewer formal powers at its disposal. Formal authority in the abstract or on
paper is presumably not what we are interested in measuring. Similarly, a
court whose decisions/orders are regularly disobeyed, ignored, subjected to
legislative override—where this exists46—or also perhaps reversed by
constitutional amendment, is, ceteris paribus, less likely to be considered
strong or powerful than one that is not.
In addition to its general importance in this way, there are a number of
more specific areas in which actual practice beyond the formal rules is partly
constitutive of judicial power itself. One of these is judicial appointments.
It may be recalled that for Brinks and Blass, a court’s “ex ante autonomy” is
a function of the number of actors involved in the formal process of judicial
appointments.47 But whatever the number involved or the particular process
chosen by the drafters and built into the textual provisions, a practice and
norm of judicial appointments made (a) without any reference to political
affiliation at all (as mostly, for example, in Canada, India, and the UK),
versus (b) a practice of political appointments but of people with independent
professional stature and experience (as mostly, for example, in the U.S. and
Germany) or (c) the appointment of party loyalists with personal obligations
to the appointer, will likely affect the ex ante autonomy of the court.48 All
three possibilities can and do exist even where a single actor or institution
has the formal power of appointment.49
Similarly, the practices and norms surrounding the age (above the
textually-specified minimum) at which constitutional court judges are
appointed, in combination with the formal tenure provision, may affect a
court’s ex ante autonomy in only slightly more subtle ways. Thus the
growing practice of appointing relatively younger Supreme Court justices
(as well as more partisan ones) in the United States, when combined with the
life tenure guaranteed by Article III of the U.S. Constitution, not only
potentially increases the appointing president’s “dead hand control” into the
future, but creates greater judicial autonomy vis-à-vis future presidents and
gives individual justices decades in which to construct their “legacies” and
46. As typically under weak-form judicial review. See Tushnet, supra notes 24–25 and
accompanying text.
47. See supra text accompanying note 27.
48. Very occasionally textual provisions prohibit the judicial appointment of members of a political
party. One example is South Africa. See infra text accompanying note 96.
49. Thus, in Canada and the UK, the traditional appointments process until recently was by the
executive alone: the prime minister made appointments on the recommendation of the Minister of
Justice/Lord Chancellor, who is a member of the cabinet. In Germany, half of the Constitutional Court is
appointed by the lower house of the legislature (the Bundestag) alone, and half by the upper house (the
Bundesrat) alone. In Japan, where the Supreme Court consists mostly of party loyalists, the prime minister
appoints its members, conventionally after receiving a recommendation from the Chief Justice. See infra
text accompanying notes 163–164.
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play “the long game.” By contrast, a practice of appointing older judges
relatively close to a mandatory retirement age detracts from judicial
autonomy and the stability and coherence of a court.
One feature of judicial practice that potentially affects the ex post
autonomy of constitutional courts is the norms surrounding the issuing of
individualized or attributable opinions by judges who lack life tenure. The
civil law tradition of anonymous and unattributable judgments, which
functions as a shield to protect the independence of constitutional court
judges who are anticipating reappointment or post-judicial employment, has
been reformed (typically through legislation) to permit concurrences and
dissents in many places in recent years.50 Even where this has happened, the
development of a judicial norm of concurring or dissenting only in
exceptional circumstances, as in Germany, permits courts to maintain a veil
of ignorance between its members and government re-appointers or potential
employers in most cases.
In terms of the scope of a constitutional court’s authority, practice plays
a large role in determining its full extent. Starting with jurisdiction, perhaps
the most famous instance in all of constitutional law is the U.S. Supreme
Court’s implication of its own power of judicial review in Marbury v.
Madison.51 On the other hand, the same court’s practice of giving a fairly
narrow reading of the standing rules for federal courts—a reading, for
example, that limits the ability of federal political actors to sue for alleged
“separation of powers” violations by other branches, and asserts a “political
question” limitation on its jurisdiction—reduces the scope of its authority in
ways not clearly given or mandated by the text. Two other prominent
examples come from the Colombian Constitutional Court. First, it took a
broad view of its jurisdiction, and hence authority, in dealing with a series of
cases in which it attempted to resolve the mortgage and internal displaced
person crises in the country by holding “legislative-style” informational and
policy hearings, issuing a series of structural orders, and maintaining control
to monitor compliance.52 Second, in developing its “substitution of the
constitution” doctrine, the Court declared it has the power to invalidate
constitutional amendments that seek to alter fundamental principles of the
existing text, which amount to replacements rather than amendments, absent

50. See, e.g., Katalin Kelemen, Dissenting Opinions in Constitutional Courts, 14 GER. L.J. 1345,
1345 (2013).
51. See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
52. See David Landau, Political Institutions and Judicial Role in Comparative Constitutional Law,
51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 319, 358–62 (2010). In the context of displaced persons, the Court developed the
“unconstitutional state of affairs” doctrine to support and justify its broad evidentiary and remedial
measures.
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the calling of a constituent assembly.53 Similarly to the Colombian Court,
the German Constitutional Court essentially gave itself jurisdiction over
claims to minimum social welfare benefits, despite no clear granting of such
power or (in the German case) such constitutional rights in the text.54 The
accessibility of constitutional courts is also affected by such deeply practical
issues as geographic location, cost, formalities, and the need for a lawyer.
The sua sponte decision of the Indian Supreme Court to accept a so-called
“epistolary jurisdiction,” by which it may take a case based on a letter written
to one of its judges, has been an important symbol of its accessibility role
and public identity.55
The remedial powers of constitutional courts, especially more
innovative ones, have frequently been the product of judicial practice rather
than formal constitutional design. For example, the Canadian Supreme
Court began using the suspended declaration of invalidity, by which
legislatures are given a deadline for amending or repealing an
unconstitutional statute themselves, in the early 1990s.56 Although it is
contested whether this is more or less respectful of legislative privileges,57
and thus more or less appropriate, than the text-based immediate declaration
of invalidity, it is not contested that this remedial power was self-granted.
Similarly, in adjudicating and applying the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act
1990, the New Zealand Court of Appeals (at the time the highest court in
New Zealand) created a public law damages remedy for violations by the
executive that was not contained in the text.58 Most recently, the Supreme
Court of New Zealand has agreed to hear a case on appeal in which the lower
court implied a power to issue a declaration of inconsistency between a
statute and the Bill of Rights Act, despite the absence of such a formal power
in the text.59 On the other hand, it has taken a narrower approach to the scope
of its power to interpret statutes consistently with the bill of rights than the
United Kingdom Supreme Court, a power that is in effect remedial, despite
very similar textual provisions. Thus, the UK Court has taken a more

53. See Decisions C-140 of 2005 and C-1041 of 2010 in ESPINOSA & LANDAU, supra note 20, at
342–60.
54. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG][Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 9, 2010 1 BvL
1/09 (Ger.) (leading to Hartz IV and V benefit reform). The textual provisions of the Basic Law on which
the FCC has relied are the inviolability of human dignity in Article 1 and the description of the federal
republic as a “democratic and social federal state” in Article 20.
55. See, e.g., Jeremy Cooper, Poverty and Constitutional Justice: The Indian Experience, 44
MERCER L. REV. 611, 624 (1993).
56. The first such case was Schachter v. Canada [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679.
57. See Leckey, supra note 26.
58. Simpson v. Attorney-General (Baigent’s Case) [1994] 3 NZLR 667 (CA).
59. Attorney-General v. Taylor [2017] NZCA 215 at [3].
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“adventurous” approach that amounts to judicial modification of statutes,60
an approach the New Zealand Court has rejected and described as
“unreasonable.”61 The Colombian Constitutional Court’s development of
the “state of unconstitutional affairs” doctrine has been the basis for some of
its broadest remedial orders.62
Finally, although to be sure not unconnected to several other listed
factors, the quality of a constitutional court’s judicial reasoning tends to add
or detract from its authority, both generally and in specific cases. A court
that issues weak, badly reasoned, or transparently instrumental judgments is
less likely to be, and be seen as, a consequential institutional actor than one
that does the opposite. Recent decisions of the Venezuelan Supreme Court
are an extreme example of this point.63 By contrast, the generally wellreasoned and comprehensive judgments of the Colombian Court have added
to its authority and prestige.64 At the level of specific, rather than general,
authority, the widely-held view that the U.S. Supreme Court’s judicial
reasoning in support of a constitutional right to abortion in Roe v. Wade65
was fairly weak affected the way the decision was received and added to its
vulnerability.66 By contrast, the generally better and more fully reasoned
opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey67 appears to have somewhat greater
authority and has perhaps enabled the “essential holding of Roe” to withstand
a multi-decade political crusade to overturn it. Similarly, whether Griswold
v. Connecticut,68 Roe’s foundation and precursor, would have survived on

60. See AILEEN KAVANAGH, CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW UNDER THE UK HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 309
(2009).
61. R v. Hansen [2007] 3 NZLR 1.
62. See CEPEDA ESPINOSA & LANDAU, supra note 20, at 178–90.
63. See, e.g., Pedro Rosas, How Venezuela’s Supreme Court Triggered One of the Biggest Political
Crises in the Country’s History, VOX (May 1, 2017), at https://www.vox.com/world/
2017/5/1/15408828/venezuela-protests-maduro-parliament-supreme-court-crisis.
64. See, e.g., Inter.-Am. Comm’n H.R., Third Report on the Human Rights Situation in Colombia
para. 17, at 36–37, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102 Doc. 9 rev. 1 (February 26, 1999) (stating that, “The Commission
has observed that the Constitutional Court, which only began to function in 1992, has attained a high
level of respectability and prestige through its independent and objective treatment of issues of great
importance for the exercise of human rights and the rule of law in Colombia. The Court has issued wellreasoned decisions on issues ranging from the constitutionality of amnesties for political crimes,
legislation relating to the rights of women in the work force, declared states of emergency, etc.”).
65. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
66. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J.
920, 933–36 (1973); Daniel A. Farber, Did Roe v. Wade Pass the Arbitrary and Capricious Test?, 70
MO. L. REV. 1231, 1231–33 (2005).
67. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
68. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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the highly questionable authority of the majority opinion alone,69 without the
support of the concurrences (and especially that of Justice Harlan), is
anyone’s guess.
C. Specific or Immediate Political and Electoral Context
The autonomy and authority of constitutional courts is, however, not
only a function of formal powers and (sometimes) evolving legal/judicial
practice but also of the more rapidly changing contingencies of political
context. As a result, where a given constitutional court stands on the metric
of power is not always fixed, or even relatively stable, but can fluctuate
significantly with shifts in the political winds. Specifically with respect to
the other constitutive components of judicial power, different alignments of
political and electoral forces can have a marked impact.
For example, regarding the ex ante autonomy of constitutional courts
vis-à-vis the other institutions of a polity, the consequences of a two-thirds
legislative voting rule for judicial appointments will vary depending on the
results of the previous election and the voting system used. So, for example,
whereas in the political context of Germany’s complex proportional
representation voting system that essentially ensures (a) no single party will
have a majority of legislators and (b) a coalition government, the result of a
two-thirds supermajority requirement for appointment to the constitutional
court is to promote consensus candidates who can attract cross-party
support.70 Combined with the rolling twelve-year term and resulting
multiple vacancies at a time, which ensures a division of spoils among the
major parties, the German court is typically staffed with centrist judges from
more than one party.71 By contrast, the same two-thirds judicial appointment
rule in Hungary, combined with a voting system that has permitted Viktor
Orban’s Fidesz party to win two-thirds of the seats in the unicameral
legislature with 52%, 45%, and 49% of the vote respectively in 2010, 2014,
and 2018 has enabled Fidesz to pack the constitutional court with party
loyalists and largely destroy its autonomy.72

69. See, e.g., Jamal Greene, The So-Called Right to Privacy, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 715, 722 (2010)
(“‘Penumbras and emanations’ has become an in-joke around the law schools as shorthand for activist
constitutional adjudication, an invitation for the Court ‘to protect those activities that enough Justices to
form a majority think ought to be protected and not activities with which they have little sympathy.’”)
(quoting ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 99
(1991)).
70. See Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra note 43, at 1681, 1702.
71. Id. at 2004.
72. See Kim Lane Scheppele, Hungary’s Attacks on the Rule of Law and Why They Matter for
Business, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2014, https://www.ft.com/content/6c538e70-168f-3d1e-ba928a80790a6247.
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In terms of ex post autonomy, a non-life tenured constitutional court
judge who can reasonably expect a change of government through electoral
or other means by the time she/he may be seeking either re-appointment or
post-judicial public employment, might have somewhat different incentives
than one who cannot. To the extent that the prospect or reality of being
overruled by constitutional amendment impacts the power of a court
(especially absent the power to invalidate it), the likelihood of such
amendment is similarly a function not only of the formal amendment rule,
but also of the immediate, practical political context of whether the necessary
votes are there. For example, while Fidesz in Hungary was able not only to
amend but to replace the entire constitution under the pre-existing two-thirds
amendment rule shortly after winning a supermajority of legislative seats in
2010, proposed constitutional amendments in the United States almost never
get past the same two-thirds rule needed to send them to the states for
ratification.73 This is due not simply to the extreme rarity of such a
supermajority for one party but also to the hyperpolarized nature of modern
party politics in the United States that enhances all the veto points in the
system.74 By contrast, less polarized political systems are more often able to
reach the cross-party consensus necessary for constitutional amendments
absent a single party/bloc legislative supermajority.
Another source of judicial power that can broadly be categorized as part
of the immediate political context in which constitutional courts operate are
public opinion polls. Thus, to the extent that in certain countries,
constitutional courts regularly receive higher approval ratings from the
public than the other political institutions and actors, this provides a
supplementary source of both autonomy and authority, as well as legitimacy
that may embolden them to act in ways they might otherwise not do. Indeed,
there is an increasing tendency on the part of such courts to actually refer to
their higher public support as a basis for the legitimacy of their actions and
role.75
IV. FROM MEASURING TO EXPLAINING JUDICIAL POWER
The previous Part attempted to identify the factors that combine to
determine how consequential and powerful a given constitutional court is.

73. Of course, in the United States, both houses of Congress must pass the proposed amendment
by a two-thirds vote.
74. See generally, Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of
Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273 (2011).
75. For the role that modern public opinion polls have had in changing the way that courts justify
their power and use of it, see Or Bassok, The Supreme Court at the Bar of Public Opinion Polls, 23
CONSTELLATIONS 573 (2016).
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As we saw, legal and judicial practices can and do expand or reduce a court’s
power relative to its formal autonomy and authority, as is also true of the
concrete and immediate electoral/political context in which it operates. All
three factors must be taken into account in order to properly and accurately
measure the power of a constitutional court, although they are neither fixed
over time nor hermetically sealed from each other. To the contrary, through
a process of mutual interaction, each of the three helps to shape and
constitute the more specific components of a court’s institutional power,
which include the jurisdictional and remedial powers it has and employs, the
ease or difficulty of constitutional amendment, and its composition and
tenure.
Armed with this minimally refined way of measuring the power of
constitutional courts, we can apply it to postulate that Court A is more
powerful than Court B, even in situations where Court A and Court B appear
to have similar formal powers. What we cannot yet do, at least satisfactorily,
is explain why Court A is more powerful than Court B; not in the sense of
re-stating the measure, but of accounting for it. Why is it able to expand its
power through judicial practice? Or, why does Court C rarely use its formal
powers, or why has Court D grown more (or less) powerful over time? What
beyond the factors that measure and determine judicial power helps to
explain individual measurements? This is the burden to be taken up in this
part. The three broad explanatory factors suggested are (1) deliberate
constitutional design choices; (2) legal culture; and (3) general political and
social context, understood in a more systematic or structural and less
immediate, numerical, or electoral sense than in the previous part.
A. Deliberate Constitutional Design Choices
As a general starting point, the grant of formal legal powers will
ordinarily reflect and express the deliberate design choices of constitutional
drafters as to how powerful a court they wish to create.76 For example, in
deciding to give the new Federal Constitutional Court extensive formal
jurisdiction and powers, including banning political parties as well as
multiple heads of constitutional review, the members of the Parliamentary
Council drafting the 1949 German Basic Law were deliberately creating a
more powerful judicial “guardian of the constitution” and the rule of law than

76. See, e.g., Brinks & Blass, supra note 4, at 299. It should be noted that these include not only
the substantive choices listed in Part III.A above but also the “meta” ones concerning, for example, how
much room to leave for judicial interpretation and the scope of the constitution.
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under the Weimar Constitution.77 The “third wave” of democratization since
1989 has generally been characterized by the intentional creation on the part
of constituent assemblies and drafters of either brand new or more powerful
constitutional courts than before,78 especially in Asia and Latin America. For
example, the Colombian Constitutional Court, created by the constituent
assembly as a key part of the 1991 Constitution, was designed to be a
consequential actor in the new constitutional order that could, among other
things, serve as both a protector of rights and a counterweight to the recent
history of powerful executives.79 Not only was it given the old constitutional
powers of the existing Supreme Court, which had exercised them in a mostly
formalistic and deferential manner, but a series of important new ones.
These included the key tutela jurisdiction, permitting ordinary citizens to
petition the courts for violations of their fundamental rights for the first
time.80
By contrast, the drafters of the French Conseil constitutionnel intended
to create a less powerful, narrowly focused institution, the major task of
which was not to serve as the general reviewer of legislation—including for
rights violations—it subsequently became, but rather to keep the legislature
from encroaching on the Fifth Republic’s new executive lawmaking
powers.81 This was reflected in the narrow formal jurisdiction given to the
Conseil. Originally only the Presidents of the Republic, the National
Assembly, and the Senate could petition it, and only before the legislation
was promulgated. Similarly, drafters of the new bills of rights in New
Zealand and the United Kingdom deliberately sought to limit the growth of
judicial power under them in order to preserve the fundamental
constitutional principle of “parliamentary sovereignty” in these countries.82
So although both bills of rights granted new and enhanced judicial powers
for the protection of rights, they institutionalized what has been referred to
as “weak-form judicial review” as distinct from the more standard “strongform.”83 Whether this initial attempt to design less powerful constitutional

77. See JUSTIN COLLINGS, DEMOCRACY’S GUARDIAN: A HISTORY OF THE GERMAN FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT xxvi (2015) (referring to the Basic Law’s “staggering conferral of judicial
authority”).
78. See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, FRAGILE DEMOCRACIES 191 (2015).
79. See CEPEDA ESPINOSA & LANDAU, supra note 20, at 10.
80. See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA Jul. 4, 1991, art. 86.
81. See Alec Stone Sweet, The Politics of Constitutional Review in France and Europe, 5 INT’L J.
CONST. L. 69, 80 (2007). Unusually in a unitary state, Article 34 of the constitution creates an enumerated
list of legislative lawmaking powers, with the remainder held by the executive.
82. See STEPHEN GARDBAUM, THE NEW COMMONWEALTH MODEL OF CONSTITUTIONALISM:
THEORY AND PRACTICE 7–8 (2013).
83. See Tushnet, supra note 24, at 2785–86.
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courts by limiting their formal powers has been overtaken by the other
factors of legal practice and political context and, if so, why this has
happened is the subject of scholarly disagreement.84
As some of these examples indicate, the deliberate design choices of
constitutional framers are usually an important, but often not a sufficient,
explanatory factor. They sometimes cannot explain, for example, why
certain courts are able to enhance their powers beyond those originally
bestowed, why others rarely use those formally granted, or why the power
of some courts increases over time without changes in the framers’ text.
B. Legal Culture
Legal culture can help to fill the explanatory gap. Three general
variables that may enhance or detract from the ability of courts to increase
their own power are (1) the status of judges, (2) their historical degree of
independence, and (3) cultural adherence to rule of law norms within a
system, although the three are frequently linked. Thus, where all three are
high, as for example generally within the common law tradition, then ceteris
paribus the actual and potential future decisions of judges granted the power
of constitutional review are more likely to be treated seriously and with
respect—as consequential—by other political actors in the constitutional
order, because the political costs of failing to do so are likely to be higher
than in a system where some or all are not the case. It is in significant part
for this reason that, with the notable exceptions of the United States, Ireland,
and India, until recently most other common law countries expressly denied
the power of judicial review of legislation to their high status, independent
judges, in favor of the central constitutional principle of parliamentary
sovereignty.85 This principle imposed a fairly clear limit on the accretion of
political and public law-making power in the courts that was considered a
requirement of representative democracy. Where the status and relative
independence of ordinary judges is lower, as mostly in the civil law
tradition,86 the creation of new and specialized constitutional courts with
different personnel and appointments processes was often deemed necessary

84. See Aileen Kavanagh, What’s So Weak About “Weak-Form Review”? The Case of the UK
Human Rights Act 1998, supra note 35; see also Stephen Gardbaum, What’s So Weak About “WeakForm Review”: A Reply to Aileen Kavanagh, 13 INT’L J. CONST. L. 1040 (2015).
85. This reason also perhaps helps to explain why “weak-form judicial review” might be somewhat
less weak in practice in such jurisdictions than in others.
86. Because there are typically far more judges than in common law countries and because the
judiciary is an entry-level, civil service career in which promotion depends significantly on peer review
by more senior judges.
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to bolster the effectiveness and power of the judicial review function.87 By
contrast, where judicial review remains “decentralized” and exercised by an
ordinary, lower status career judiciary in the broadly civil law tradition, one
might expect such courts to be relatively weak, as in Scandinavia.
Relatedly, as Theunis Roux has argued in the context of democratic
transitions, the nature of a legal culture as strongly or weakly
institutionalized, or relatively formalistic versus substantive in what is
expected of judicial decisionmaking, can significantly affect the agency and
power of constitutional courts.88 Thus, where the legitimacy of a court’s
decision is taken to require a relatively legalistic mode of reasoning that
respects the law/politics distinction, this acts as a constraint compared to a
legal culture more skeptical of the distinction in which courts are freer to
take substantive and normative considerations into account.89 Indeed,
cultural adherence to legalism is a second way (in addition, or as an
alternative, to the historical resistance to judicial review) in which many
common law countries have attempted to limit the role of courts in their
constitutional orders. On the other hand, where a legal culture is strongly
institutionalized and/or relatively formalistic but combines this with a high
regard for judicial status and independence, this can serve to insulate
constitutional courts from political attack.90
A more specific instance of the role of general legal culture in helping
to explain the degree or extent of judicial power is the set of beliefs
surrounding a country’s constitution and its impact on the likelihood of
constitutional amendment. As we have seen, the all-things-considered ease
or difficulty of constitutional amendment is an important ingredient of
judicial power: the easier it is in practice to amend a constitution to
effectively overrule a constitutional court, the less consequential its rulings
are likely to be. But over and above both the formal rules and the immediate
political context that helps to determine whether the formal standard can be
met, norms and cultures surrounding the resort to constitutional amendment
may range from the inviolable and “sacred” nature of the existing text to the
disposable/pragmatic. Despite the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court (most
likely) lacks the power to review the substantive constitutionality of
amendments, the near-sacred character in which the Constitution is held
87. See MAURO CAPPELLETTI, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 49–51
(1989).
88. See THEUNIS ROUX, THE POLITICS OF PRINCIPLE: THE FIRST SOUTH AFRICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, 1995-2005 72–111 (2013); Theunis Roux, The South African Constitutional
Court’s Democratic Rights Jurisprudence, 5 CONST. CT, REV. 33, 54–61 (2015) (hereinafter Democratic
Rights Jurisprudence).
89. Democratic Rights Jurisprudence, supra note 88, at 46–47.
90. Id.
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further adds to the difficulty, and helps to explain the infrequency, of formal
constitutional amendment such that in practice this does not significantly
affect its overall power. Moreover, as the widely perceived primary or
distinctive “guardian” of the near-sacred Constitution, the Supreme Court
gains added cultural prestige and legitimacy relative to the other institutions
of government. By contrast, the relative frequency of successful amendment
suggests there is no significant cultural barrier to changing (as distinct from
replacing) the German Basic Law, including to effectively overrule the
Constitutional Court. Accordingly, even though the Court is equally viewed
as the guardian of the Basic Law and appears to enjoy a high level of public
support for its work, it lacks this additional source of cultural capital.
C. General Political Context
The third broad category of factors that helps to explain relative strength
or weakness is the general political context in which a constitutional court
operates.91 The breadth of this category ranges all the way from basic
structural or macro-political variables, such as the general democratic or
authoritarian nature of the regime, to increasingly more detailed, specific or
micro-political variations. Only short-term alignments of political forces are
excluded here, because they are considered in Part II.C above, as interacting
with formal rules and powers in the constitution of judicial autonomy and
authority. Starting at the more macro-level, the political space available for
more independent, robust, and consequential constitutional courts is in
significant part a function of the general political regime in which it
operates.92
Some very interesting and cutting edge comparative
constitutional scholarship has recently focused on both non-liberal versions
of constitutionalism and the strategic political reasons that even fully
authoritarian regimes may have to empower or permit a certain degree of
autonomy and/or authority among one or more of their courts.93 This
scholarship demonstrates the necessity of the qualification “in significant
part” above, as with such regimes too, the particular context matters.
91. See KAPISZEWSKI ET AL., supra note 18, at 22 (discussing “major domestic political regime
features” as one of the relatively enduring structural factors that influence the role constitutional courts
play).
92. For an insightful demonstration of this point, as it applies in Asia, see PO JEN YAP, COURTS
AND DEMOCRACIES IN ASIA (2017).
93. See, e.g., TOM GINSBURG & ALBERTO SIMPSER EDS., CONSTITUTIONS IN AUTHORITARIAN
REGIMES (2014) (exploring mechanisms by which authoritarian regimes utilize constitutions to
consolidate their power and establish norms, especially during moments of internal conflict); Li-Ann
Thio, Constitutionalism in Illiberal Polities in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 133 (Michel Rosenfeld & András Sajo eds., 2012) (creating a typology of
constitutionalism in different authoritarian regimes); Mark Tushnet, Authoritarian Constitutionalism, 100
CORNELL L. REV. 391 (2015) (examining characteristics of authoritarian constitutionalism in Singapore).
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With this important caveat in mind, let me suggest that for current
purposes there are five general regime types which help to explain the
political space available for, and hence the overall strength or weakness of,
constitutional or supreme courts operating within them.94 The first two are
variations of liberal democracy: (1) competitive party liberal democracies
and (2) dominant party liberal democracies, such as Japan, pre-2000 Mexico,
and South Africa. The relevant difference between them, due to the latter’s
absence of rotation in office, is the respective degree of concentration or
dispersal of political power other than in the very short-term (i.e., as the
result of a single, given election), and the opportunities such concentration
provides for influencing, inter alia, the composition of the courts and/or the
reception that court decisions might receive from political elites. Thus, in
Japan, the dominance of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) combined with
the legal power of the prime minister to appoint judges to the Supreme Court,
has resulted in a court packed mostly with its party loyalists.95 In South
Africa, where party or government members are prohibited from serving on
the constitutional court and the constitution establishes an independent
Judicial Service Commission to screen candidates for final presidential
selection,96 the dominant status of the African National Congress (ANC)
means that its actions (or omissions) are inevitably and uniformly the object
of judicial review. This, in turn, means that the Court cannot help but be
conscious of the reception of, and potential backlash against, its decisions,
which tend to have no natural, major party support or defenders,97 unlike in
competitive party democracies. While this has not prevented the Court from
exercising greater independence than the Japanese or pre-2000 Mexican
supreme courts, especially more recently as the ANC’s dominance has been
in decline, it is nonetheless “constrained” and must tread carefully.98 Within
dominant party democracies, whether a constitutional court is effectively the
only independent institution or exists alongside others, as well as a robust

94. General regime type usually helps to set the outer parameters of judicial power, but it does not
always explain where within the parameters it falls. So, there may be significant variations in the strength
and weakness of constitutional courts within each category, e.g., among competitive party liberal
democracies.
95. See Tushnet & Dixon, supra note 35, at 113–14. Again, such packing is not simply the result
of judicial appointment by a single actor, but of its combination with a dominant political party and a
norm/practice of appointing party loyalists. Absent both of the latter factors, there would be greater
judicial pluralism on the court. See supra text accompanying notes 48–49.
96. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, § 174.
97. Although this may be changing with the electoral decline of the ANC and the rise of the
opposition Democratic Alliance.
98. See Roux, Democratic Rights Jurisprudence, supra note 88, at 70−72 (explaining how the
ANC’s consolidation of power affected democratic rights jurisprudence of the Court).

GARDBAUM_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

26

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

11/26/2018 9:03 AM

[Vol 29:1

media and civil society, also impacts its room for maneuver and ability to
protect both itself and the constitutional order against democratic erosion.99
By contrast, (3) “illiberal democracies,” such as contemporary
Hungary, Poland, Turkey, and (until the last year or so) Venezuela, are
characterized by a competitive party system and reasonably free and fair
elections, but also a reduction or erosion of democracy to essentially majority
rule. This is accomplished by the concentration of power in the governing
(typically, populist/nationalist) party, and usually its leader, not as a natural
political consequence of electoral dominance over time (as with dominant
party liberal democracies) but of affirmative steps following electoral victory
to maximize on and entrench its position, and curb the independence of any
institution it does not control.100 This typically includes the constitutional
court, as all four examples illustrate; although once it controls the judiciary,
the target might become the legislature with the court acting as the
government’s agent, as recently occurred in Venezuela.101 Such affirmative
and deliberate steps go well beyond influencing the composition of the court
over time through the pre-existing rules of appointment, instead changing
these rules in its favor, increasing or reducing the size of the court, reducing
its powers and jurisdiction, firing “opposition” members, and even physical
threats.102
Arguably distinct are (4) authoritarian constitutionalist regimes, such as
Singapore, which also have reasonably free and fair elections and are not
liberal democracies, but tend to have a truly—i.e., long established—
dominant political party that affords some degree of independence to their
courts and certain rights to all citizens.103 While this degree of independence

99. See Stu Woolman, A Politics of Accountability: How South Africa’s Judicial Recognition of the
Binding Legal Effect of the Public Protector’s Recommendations Had a Catalysing Effect that Brought
Down a President, 8 CONST. CT. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript on file with author) (showing how
holding former President Zuma accountable for his corruption was a team effort between the
Constitutional Court, the independent Public Prosecutor, opposition political parties, the media, and civil
society groups).
100. For a recent case study, see Wojciech Sadurski, How Democracy Dies (in Poland): A Case
Study of Anti-Constitutional Populist Backsliding 10–14 (Sydney Law Sch., Legal Studies Research
Paper No. 18/01, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3103491. Where these
steps include amending or replacing a constitution for such ends, it has been termed “abusive
constitutionalism.” David Landau, Abusive Constitutionalism, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 189, 191 (2013).
101. The constitutional court initially took over the legislature’s functions until essentially ordered
by the president to change its mind, in the face of massive international and domestic denunciation.
102. As, for example, in Hungary since 2010 and Poland since 2015. See Scheppele, supra note 72
(Hungary); Sadurski, supra note 100, at 41–42 (Poland).
103. See Tushnet, supra note 93, at 413–15. Either or both “illiberal democracy” and “authoritarian
constitutionalism” may overlap with a new, post-Cold War intermediate regime type between democracy
and full authoritarianism that has been termed “competitive authoritarianism.” See STEVEN LEVITSKY &
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is likely to be fairly stable and not under severe, short-term attack, it is
typically more circumscribed in terms of both composition and concern
about reception of its decisions by political elites than in either type of liberal
democracy, especially on constitutional issues.104
Finally, (5) fully authoritarian regimes come in several forms, including
one party states like China, multiparty presidential republics like El-Sisi’s
Egypt, or absolute monarchies like Saudi Arabia. Clearly, boundary
problems exist (has Venezuela moved all the way from competitive party
liberal democracy to fully authoritarian regime in two decades?) as do the
distinct issues raised by “fragile” or “weak” democracies, but the role, space,
and independence—and therefore the power—of constitutional courts is
significantly explicable by this primary filter of political regime type, even
among courts sharing the same formal powers. Other things being equal, the
greatest space exists where political power is least concentrated and most
contested. As we saw above, to the significant extent that voting systems
affect this—in Hungary, the mixed majoritarian system gave Orban the
crucial supermajority of seats without a supermajority of votes, whereas in
South Africa, the constitutionally-required PR system has mostly prevented
the ANC from obtaining the two-thirds of seats needed to amend the
constitution by itself—they are also an important variable shaping and
explaining judicial power.105
Of course, since general regime type tends to set the outer parameters
of judicial power, other structural factors help to explain the fact that not all
competitive party liberal democracies have constitutional courts of equal
consequence.Apart from the long-understood fact that there is a close
historical and functional connection between judicial review and federalism
in terms of umpiring institutional disputes concerning allocation of powers
between the two levels of government,106 federalism may also increase “the
demand” for judicial intervention on rights issues and thereby create greater
opportunities for courts. The 2015 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in
Obergefell v. Hodges107 might be seen as the Court imposing its will on the
nation, but it can also be viewed as imposing the nation’s will on recalcitrant

LUCAN A. WAY, COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIANISM: HYBRID REGIMES AFTER THE COLD WAR 3–5
(2010).
104. See YAP, supra note 92, at 3 (describing courts’ challenges to government in dominant-party
democracies as compared to competitive party systems).
105. See Stephen Gardbaum, Political Parties, Voting Systems, and the Separation of Powers, 65
AM. J. COMP. L. 229, 242 (2017).
106. See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 327
(Henry Regnery Company 1962) (1861).
107. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584.
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states, acknowledging the social change that had recently taken place.108
Moreover, the role of partisan federalism109 in creating a forum in which
opposition party state officials can seek judicial review of federal executive
actions during periods of unified party government at the national level has
been highlighted in the first year of the Trump administration. Here, the
short-term alignment of political forces affects the role and opportunities for
consequential decision-making by courts in ways that might not otherwise
occur under more divided national government.110
While there appears to be no general relationship between the overall
strength or weakness of constitutional courts and form of government
(presidential, parliamentary, or semi-presidential), in that, for example,
perennial candidates for both most and least powerful courts come from
countries with parliamentary systems, there may be more particular ones.
Thus, “separation of powers” issues between the independent legislative and
executive branches within a presidential system may create more “business”
for a constitutional court as an impartial umpire along similar functional lines
as with federalism, especially during times of divided government.111 On the
other hand, one significant structural factor in—and explanation of—the
recent growth of judicial review in mature, Westminster-style parliamentary
democracies has been the perceived over-concentration of power in the
executive, given its typical control of the legislature through the modern
system of party discipline.112
Another important structural political factor affecting and explaining
the power of courts is how functional or dysfunctional the other branches of
government are. Two well-known examples of constitutional courts that
increased their power by stepping in to plug the gap in governance caused
by weaknesses in their political systems are the Supreme Court of India (SCI)

108. See, e.g., Pew Research Center, Support for Same-Sex Marriage Grows, Even Among Groups
that Had Been Skeptical 1 (2017), http://www.people-press.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2017/06/0626-17-Same-sex-marriage-release.pdf (showing 2011 as the first year in which more Americans favored
same-sex marriage than disfavored it).
109. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077 (2014).
110. For example, the series of federal court decisions on President Trump’s “travel bans.” See, e.g.,
Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017); Hawaii v. Trump 859 F.3d 741
(9th Cir. 2017); Washington v. Trump 858 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2017).
111. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010) (holding
that Congress’ “for cause” restriction on the President’s removal power violates the separation of powers).
But note, such issues may also be litigated in parliamentary systems. See, e.g., R v. Sec’y of State for
Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, [2017] 2 WLR 583 (appeal taken from Eng. and N. Ir.).
112. See Stephen Gardbaum, Separation of Powers and the Growth of Judicial Review in
Established Democracies (or Why Has the Model of Legislative Supremacy Mostly Been Withdrawn from
Sale?), 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 613, 638 (2014) (describing the increased role of judicial review of substance
of administrative actions in the UK).
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and the Colombian Constitutional Court. The growth of public interest
litigation in the former, whereby the SCI has largely assumed managerial
and governance functions in areas such as environmental protection, disaster
relief, and sexual harassment, was a response to the deep and pervasive sense
of government failure, inefficiency, and corruption in these areas.113
Similarly, the Colombian Court’s attempts to solve certain major structural
problems resulting in widespread rights violations through investigative
hearings, managerial orders, and continuing oversight of government
agencies for compliance has been ascribed to the dysfunctionality of the
legislature, given the weakly institutionalized party system.114 A third
example is South Africa, where the repeated failures of the national
legislature to hold President Zuma accountable for using public money to
improve his private home, as determined by the country’s Public Protector,
prompted the Constitutional Court’s increasingly bold interventions,
especially after the electoral evidence of declining support for the ANC was
clear.115 Such dysfunctionalities often also in turn help to explain the
comparatively higher public support for the courts than for the other state
institutions that is sometimes recorded in opinion polls, which then becomes
a new source of judicial power.116 By contrast, where the other branches of
government are broadly functional, as arguably for example in Scandinavia,
there is less need for courts to play such unorthodox roles so that this
particular reason for, or spur to, judicial power does not exist.
If this factor is one of several that involve the taking of power by courts,
several recent influential accounts of the growth of judicial review have
identified a different set of strategic political factors that involve the
empowering of courts by other political actors and institutions. These are
that constitutional courts can act as “insurance policies” to political actors in
transitioning authoritarian regimes newly faced with the uncertainties of
future election results,117 as the last best hope of those who have lost their

113. HANS DEMBOWSKI, TAKING THE STATE TO COURT: PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION AND THE
PUBLIC SPHERE IN METROPOLITAN INDIA 56–61 (2001). It was also a response to The Emergency of
1975–77. See infra text accompanying note 148.
114. David Landau, Political Institutions and Judicial Role in Comparative Constitutional Law, 51
HARV. INT’L. L.J. 319, 319–22 (2010).
115. Woolman, supra note 99, at 1–6.
116. See Bassok, supra note 75, at 573 (discussing public opinion polls as an “independent source
of evidence” of public support of the U.S. Supreme Court).
117. TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN
ASIAN CASES 24–25 (2003).
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“hegemonic” political position,118 or as mediating or “hedging” the transition
to democracy by offering resistance to reversion to one-party rule.119
Even within liberal democracies, the general political culture of a
country (either alone or combined with some of the other factors discussed)
may support a more robust or minimal role for courts—whether or not this
culture is manifested in the relevant sets of formal legal powers. Thus, for a
long time different political cultures and histories in, say, the United States
and Canada, or in Germany and the Netherlands, helped to explain their
different constitutional arrangements with respect to courts and judicial
review. Today, political cultures that have changed at significantly
differential rates concerning the continuing appeal of “parliamentary
sovereignty” help to explain the different ways that courts and legislatures
have exercised broadly similar “weak-form” powers under recent bills of
rights in Canada, the UK, Australia and New Zealand.120
Beyond purely political factors, the broader socio-economic context
also undoubtedly plays a role in explaining the extent and scope of judicial
power. So, on the one hand, the widespread existence of extreme poverty
may force itself onto the judicial agenda, especially where there is a
transformational constitution and/or the other branches of government are
viewed as dysfunctional or corrupt. But on the other, a constitutional court
in a wealthy advanced industrial society like Germany has options in terms
of how social and welfare rights are judicially enforced that its counterpart
in a far poorer country such as South Africa does not have.121
V. CASE STUDIES
In this section, I apply the somewhat abstracted, multidimensional
evidentiary and explanatory factors listed above to two concrete case studies.
Indeed, in so doing I hope to show that the Indian and Japanese supreme
courts are particularly good examples of how the overall strength or
weakness of a court is a function of all three broad categories of factors.

118. RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW
CONSTITUTIONALISM 49 (2004).
119. Sam Issacharoff, Constitutional Courts and Democratic Hedging, 99 GEO. L.J. 961, 1002
(2011).
120. The differences have also been explained by the legal form that the bills of rights have taken:
constitutional or statutory. See Rivka Weill, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism
Notwithstanding: On Judicial Review and Constitution-Making, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 127, 128–133 (2014).
121. Here, I’m referring to the German Constitutional Court’s well-known position that implied
social rights guarantee a minimum level of substantive state support, whereas the South African
Constitutional Court has interpreted express social rights as not doing so but rather imposing a duty on
the state to take reasonable measures in the relevant areas.
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They also illustrate the role that political context in particular plays in
explaining the extent of judicial power.
A. The Indian Supreme Court
The SCI is often viewed as one of the most powerful constitutional
courts in the world.122 In the past three years alone it has issued a series of
extraordinary and eye-catching rulings that bespeak a large and significant
role in Indian society. For example, in August 2017, a nine-judge bench
unanimously declared a broad, fundamental right to privacy—ranging from
gay sex to data mining—as an implication of the substantive rights to “life”
and “personal liberty” that the Court has interpreted Article 21 to protect.123
In January 2017, the SCI held that it was unconstitutional for political
candidates to campaign on the basis of religion, caste, or ethnicity.124 In
another case the same month, it forced the ouster of the head of the national
cricket board, replacing him with former judges on an interim basis.125 In
December 2016, the SCI mandated the playing of the national anthem in
movie theaters under Article 51.126 In October 2015, it struck down a
constitutional amendment establishing a judicial appointments commission
to replace the collegium system for making senior appointments.127
In many ways the SCI has powers that other constitutional courts can
only dream about. In addition to the standard power of judicial review of
legislation granted by the text of the constitution,128 the SCI has essentially
given itself at least three important and distinctive powers over the past forty
years or so, relative to other constitutional courts. This again reflects the
constitutive importance of legal/judicial practice. The first is the power to
review the substance of constitutional amendments under the well-known
basic structure doctrine.129 The subsequent “borrowing” of this doctrine in
several countries, both elsewhere in South Asia and further afield,130 is a
testament to its regional and international influence. The second is the power
122. See sources cited supra note 1.
123. Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No 494 of 2012 (2018) 1 SCC
809 (India).
124. Abhiram Singh v CD Commachen (2014) 14 SCC 382 (India).
125. See Board of Control for Cricket in India v. Cricket Association of Bilhar (2015) 3 SCC 251
(India).
126. Shyam Narayan Chouksey v. Union of India (2016) 12 SCALE 404 (India).
127. Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (2015) 11 SCALE 1
(India).
128. INDIA CONST. art. 13, 132–35.
129. See Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225 (India) (first announcing and
applying this power); Minerva Mills v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SCR 206 (India) (subsequently strongly
reaffirming this power).
130. Arguably including, for example, Colombia. See cases cited supra note 53.
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to appoint its own members and that of the other higher courts under the
collegium system, as determined by the SCI to be a requirement of judicial
independence in the “Three Judges Cases” of 1982–1998 and affirmed in a
2013 decision dismissing a case challenging it.131 Such a system of almost
complete ex ante autonomy is rare for a constitutional court as compared
with the global norm of either political appointments of various sorts or an
independent, but not judicially-dominated, commission.132 In 2015, the SCI
used the first power to prevent a change to this second, exemplifying how
the basic structure doctrine can be used to prevent the normal possibility of
overruling a constitutional court by constitutional amendment, and so
entrenching its decisions.133 The third is the power to adjudicate public
interest litigation (PIL), which has greatly enhanced public access to courts
by essentially abolishing standing requirements and led to unorthodox
judicial remedies overseeing and managing specific policymaking areas—
including pollution control and the environment, disaster relief, child
employment, and sexual harassment. In the latter, the SCI actually “made”
the interim law by judicial order until Parliament acted.134 In this context,
the SCI has been said to have effectively become an institution of
governance. In these three ways, the SCI has substantially enhanced both its
autonomy and authority relative to its textually granted powers.
On the other hand, the Indian Constitution also contains certain formal
powers that reduce the power of the SCI relative to some other constitutional
courts. First, a relatively flexible constitutional amendment rule of twothirds of both houses of legislature,135 which has been triggered on 101
occasions since 1950. This is high by comparative standards, and the fact
that many of these amendments were adopted to overrule decisions of the
SCI prior to the 1980s was the primary reason the SCI responded by
developing the basic structure doctrine. Second, the Ninth Schedule to the
Constitution, created by the very first such amendment (“the First
Amendment”) in 1951, is an interesting and unusual constitutional provision
that is functionally similar to the better-known Section 33 of the Canadian

131. See S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 149 (India); Supreme Courts Advocates-onRecord Association v. Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 268 (India); In re Special Reference 1, AIR 1999 SC
1 (India); Suraz India Trust v. Union of India, (2012) 13 SCC 497 (India).
132. It is slightly less rare for ordinary, nonconstitutional courts.
133. See Landau & Dixon, supra note 39 at 611 (referring to this power as “super-strong judicial
review”).
134. See Vishaka & Others v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1997 SC 3011 (India).
135. INDIA CONST. art. 368 (“An amendment of this Constitution may be initiated only by the
introduction of a Bill for the purpose in either House of Parliament, and when the Bill is passed in each
House by a majority of the total membership of that House and by a majority of not less than two-thirds
of the members of that House present and voting, it shall be presented to the President . . .”).
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Charter of Rights and Freedoms,136 in that it was designed to immunize
specific pieces of legislation from judicial review. Unlike Section 33,
however, it has been fairly frequently used (there are currently 284 Acts in
the Ninth Schedule), but not since 1991. Also unlike Section 33, its use (a)
has been held by the SCI to be subject to substantive review under the basic
structure doctrine, as per a landmark 2007 decision,137 and (b) requires the
same two-thirds vote as a general constitutional amendment. Third, the
constitutional text mandates a judicial retirement age of 65.138 The practical
bite of this provision depends on the typical age of appointment; but unlike,
say, with political appointments in the US in which younger appointments
are increasingly being made, the collegium system in which seniority plays
a major role, ensures that younger judges are almost never appointed. This
combination of formal provision and legal practice affects the working of the
SCI as a whole through its impact on individual justices. As a result, there
is fairly frequent turnover of both chief and associate justices, and less time
and scope to develop either individual legacies or consistent collective
positions.
Another related aspect of legal practice that arguably reduces the power
of the SCI relative to what it otherwise might be is the growing size of the
court—from the original 8 members in 1950 to 31 today, making it one of
the largest in the world—and the increasing tendency for it to sit in smaller
and smaller panels—now typically of two or three justices—even in
significant constitutional cases.139 Although both are a function of its
increased jurisdiction and caseload with the effective abolition of standing
requirements under PIL, and so reflect its greater role and authority, the
diminishing panel size has caused concerns to be expressed about the Court’s
doctrinal coherence and consistency.140 To the extent that the precedential
effect of SCI decisions is weakened or questioned as a result, their
consequential nature and its political power are reduced.

136. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.)
(“Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act of Parliament or of the
legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a
provision included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15.”).
137. I.R. Coehlo v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2007 SC 861 (India); cf. Ford v. Quebec (Attorney
General), [1988] 2 S.C.R 712, 727 (Can.) (no substantive judicial review of use of section 33).
138. INDIA CONST. art. 124(2).
139. This is unusual in the common law world where supreme courts tend to sit in plenary sessions.
140. See Madhav Khosla, The Problem, 642 SEMINAR 12, 13 (2013) (arguing that small bench
decisions threaten the doctrine of precedent and the rule of law); see also Nick Robinson, Structure
Matters: The Impact of Court Structure on the Indian and U.S. Supreme Courts, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 173,
182–92 (2013).
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Finally, any realistic assessment of the consequential nature of the SCI
must take into account the general socio-economic context of India. This
means that despite its extensive powers, jurisdiction, and governance role, as
with other branches of government in the country, it is often extremely
difficult to translate institutional power and prestige into meaningful and
tangible policy impact. The sources of this deep structural recalcitrance are
several. First and foremost is the country’s massive population living at premodern poverty levels, which in turn contributes enormously to a very low
tax base and a hugely underfunded state.141 For example, these factors
explain the absence of free, compulsory elementary education in India until
2009: political opposition to compulsory education on the part of the mass
of poor farmers who rely on their children as a source of free labor, and the
lack of state funding to pay for it.142 If enacting the law was difficult enough,
enforcing it—including through the courts—is even harder. Bureaucratic
inertia and corruption add a different dimension to the problem, as does the
gap between the legal elite/system and the mass of the population,143 both
manifested and compounded by the fact that the higher courts operate in a
language (English) that most citizens do not understand.
In terms of explanatory factors, it seems clear from both their debates
and final text that the initial design choice of the Constituent Assembly,
which sat from 1946 to 1949, was to create a somewhat more consequential
constitutional court than was typical in the inherited English common law
tradition at that time. On the other hand, it also seems clear that the SCI has
become more powerful in recent decades,144 in significant part through the
addition and exercise of the three self-granted powers described above that
were not envisaged or bestowed by the framers, so that deliberate design
choice alone cannot explain its modern position. Two features of general
legal culture are, I believe, a necessary part of the story. First, the status of
judges in India is extraordinarily high, even by normal common law
standards. Again, ceteris paribus, this not only enhances the likelihood that
courts will be consequential actors in the constitutional order, but also that
power will accrete to them over time. Second, and relatedly, even before the
collegium system displaced prime ministerial appointment in 1993, there
141. See, e.g., Kiran Stacey, India Shows Neighbours the Way Out of Tax Trap, FINANCIAL TIMES
(May 18, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/d3134d5a-4d17-11e8-8a8e-22951a2d8493.
142. See, e.g., Krishna Kumat, Where Knowledge is Poor, THE HINDU (October 13, 2016), at
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/Where-knowledge-is-poor/article11801428.ece.
143. See Manoj Mate, Elite Institutionalism and Judicial Assertiveness in the Supreme Court of
India, 28 TEMPLE INT’L & COMP. L. J. 361, 364–65 (2014) (referring to this gap as “elite
institutionalism”).
144. Manoj Mate, The Rise of Judicial Governance in the Supreme Court of India, 33 B.U. L. REV.
169, 170 (2015).
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was a strong culture and practice of non-political judicial appointments (with
the notable exception of the Indira Ghandi era), which helped to establish the
independence of the SCI as a political actor from the outset.
But general political context plays perhaps the major role in explaining
the changing contours of judicial power. Indeed, India provides a
paradigmatic example of the interplay of legal powers and political realities
that both shape and explain the empirical power of constitutional courts. For
a key variable in the position of the SCI over the course of Indian
constitutional history has been the presence or absence of a dominant
political party within its parliamentary system of government. During the
first three and a half decades of Indian independence, the Congress Party was
the dominant political force and its longstanding commitment to land reform
and redistribution in favor of the poor resulted in near-continuous skirmishes
with the courts’ defense of private property rights under the fundamental
rights provisions of the Constitution.145 Although the SCI frequently ruled
that land reform legislation was unconstitutional as providing insufficient
compensation to owners, successive Congress Party governments were
relatively easily able to respond by amending the Constitution, first by
creating (and filling) the Ninth Schedule and later by removing the right to
property,146 given the combination of the formal amendment rule of twothirds of both houses of the legislature and their political dominance at the
time. The SCI’s initial, albeit somewhat tentative, creation of the basic
structure doctrine in 1973 was itself a response to this constitutional
landscape. It is certainly no coincidence that the perceived growth of judicial
power in India coincided with the end of Congress Party dominance, as
manifested in the rise of both PIL and the collegium system, as well as the
Court’s strong and unanimous affirmation of the basic structure doctrine in
1980.147 All three were also “political” responses of a court determined to
regain its prestige in the eyes of the public after the low point of judicial
power during the “Emergency” of 1975–77, when the SCI was widely
perceived as having capitulated to the government’s assaults on

145. The clash between the SCI and successive Congress Party governments over land reform and
property rights was the most frequent and prominent source of friction, but not the only one. The First
Amendment itself also overruled SCI judgements protecting freedom of speech and holding that caste
quotas in government-supported medical and engineering schools violated the constitutional right to
equality.
146. By the 44th Amendment to the Constitution of 1978, the rights to property contained in Articles
19(1)(f) and 31 were removed from the category of Fundamental Rights in Part III and a diluted provision
stating that “no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law” was inserted as Art.
300A.
147. Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 1789, 1811 (India).
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constitutional liberties.148 Moreover, since the end of the Congress Party
dominance and (thus far) the absence of a replacement, both constitutional
amendment and use of the Ninth Schedule have become practically more
difficult and relatively more rare; in response, the SCI has only infrequently
employed its basic structure power, notwithstanding the recent instance.
B. The Japanese Supreme Court
By contrast with the SCI, the Japanese Supreme Court (SCJ) is widely
seen as the paradigm of a weak or “conservative” court.149 The evidence
usually given is that it has held statutes unconstitutional, in whole or part,
only eight times in its history, although as suggested above in discussing
both measures of power and alternative remedies, this figure does not
necessarily tell the whole story and the SCJ has on a few other occasions
protected rights by employing the technique of narrowly construing
legislative provisions.150 More than the numbers alone, however, it is clear
that the SCJ plays a relatively small role in the Japanese constitutional order,
which is mostly enforced politically, rather than judicially. For example, in
all the discussions and controversies over the legitimacy and
constitutionality of the Abe government’s July 2014 “reinterpretation” of
Article 9, the “pacifist clause” of the constitution,151 to permit “collective
self-defense” abroad in support of Japan’s allies for the first time, the almost
complete silence concerning the role and potential future position of the SCJ
on the issue speaks volumes. No one appears to be waiting for, or expects,
the SCJ to “resolve” the issue in the way, for example, almost everyone was
in the United States on the question of same-sex marriage. The question is
why? What factors explain its low profile?
The answer surely isn’t legal powers, for the SCJ was largely modeled
on the U.S. Supreme Court and broadly shares its formal authority, starting
with the almost identical wording from Article III that “the whole judicial
power” is vested in “a Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as are

148. See, e.g., Mate, supra note 144, at 171 (discussing the reactionary nature of PIL to previous
Supreme Court of India decisions).
149. See generally Matsui, supra note 5.
150. Matsui, supra note 15, at 149; Frank Upham, Stealth Activism: Norm Formation by Japanese
Courts, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1493, 1496 (2011).
151. See generally Craig Martin, The Legitimacy of Informal Constitutional Amendment and the
“Reinterpretation” of Japan’s War Powers, 40 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 427 (2017); Rosalind Dixon & Guy
Baldwin, Globalizing Constitutional Moments? A Reflection on the Japanese Article 9 Debate, 74
U.N.S.W. L. RES. SERIES (Jan. 1, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); Stephen
Gardbaum, Constitutional Interpretation and Reinterpretation in Japan: The Case of Article 9 (2016)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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established by law.”152 Indeed, unlike the U.S. court, the SCJ’s powers of
judicial review, which are also broadly similar to the contemporary norm for
decentralized systems, are expressly contained in the text.153 Moreover,
although the Japanese Constitution contains a more flexible formal
amendment rule than the U.S. of two-thirds of both legislative chambers plus
a simple majority in a popular referendum,154 it has never successfully been
used. Thus, a strong argument can be made that practically it is more
difficult to amend; indeed one of the most difficult in the world. Like the
U.S. Constitution, it appears to have acquired semi-sacred status.
Accordingly, the SCJ faces less prospect of being overruled via
constitutional amendment than almost all other constitutional courts,
including the U.S. (four such occasions in history) and German (several),
and certainly the SCI, basic structure doctrine aside. Although it is true that
the life tenure provision of Article III was not adopted, in favor of a
mandatory retirement age,155 the fact that none of the non-US candidates for
“most powerful constitutional court in the world” have life tenure strongly
suggests it is not an essential ingredient.
Two features of legal practice, in addition to the extremely infrequent
use of its invalidation power and generally quite deferential posture towards
the government acts it reviews, reduce the SCJ’s autonomy and authority
relative to its formal powers. First, more important than the age of
mandatory retirement (seventy) is the (discretionary) age of appointment.
Although the Judiciary Act sets a minimum age of 40, the practice has long
been to appoint SCJ justices at the age of 64 or 65, which leaves them with
relatively little time to grow into the job, develop their jurisprudence, or
create a “legacy,” and obviously creates a high turnover rate with relatively
little stability.156 Ceteris paribus, this practice undermines the autonomy and
effectiveness of the SCJ as a coherent and consequential collective
institution. The second practice is the SCJ’s narrow interpretation of its own
jurisdiction, in marked contrast to the SCI. Thus, it has expressed a fairly
broad understanding of “political questions” that deny it jurisdiction157 and
a narrow reading of its standing rules even by U.S. standards, especially in
suits against administrative agencies.158
152. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 76, para. 1 (Japan).
153. Id. art. 81.
154. Id. art. 96, para. 1.
155. See Law, supra note 5, at 1559.
156. See id. (discussing the importance of age in selecting judges).
157. See, e.g., Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 16, 1959, Sho 34 (a) no. 710, 13 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO
MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 3225 (Japan) (discussing the constitutionality of the Japan-U.S. Security
Treaty and the violation of Article 9 with the stationing of U.S. troops in Japan).
158. Matsui, supra note 5, at 1413–14.
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Initial design choices do not appear to do much by way of explanation,
as the SCJ is seemingly weaker than the legal powers granted to it by the
constitutional drafters and approvers would suggest they intended.159 With
respect to legal culture, it is well-known that Japan is close to the opposite
end of the spectrum from the United States and Germany in terms of
litigiousness and the use of law to resolve disputes, although whether this
fact is best explained culturally, institutionally (for example, is the low
number of lawyers per capita compared to the United States cause or effect?),
or politically has been much debated.160
More importantly, and
superimposed on this characteristic, as a predominantly civil law system,
ordinary judges in Japan are career officials with relatively low status, and
yet unlike most civil law countries it has adopted decentralized judicial
review rather than centralizing the function in a specialist constitutional
court with a separate appointments process.161 This relatively rare
combination of decentralized judicial review and civil service, career
judges—as distinct from either (1) decentralized review with a high status,
second career judiciary or (2) centralized review with different appointments
processes and outcomes—is a recipe for weakness/deference. The Nordic
countries are among the few to share it.
The key feature of political context that both shapes and helps to explain
judicial power, is the long-dominant position of the LDP, which has only
twice been out of power since 1946 and only then for short periods.162 This
dominance means that the LDP has appointed almost all members of the SCJ.
Moreover, because (unlike in India) there is no longstanding practice of nonpolitical appointments, prime ministers have complete discretion on whom
to appoint and have mostly exercised it in favor of party loyalists, typically
either from the hierarchical, civil service judiciary or the ranks of senior
government lawyers.163 Although there is a convention for the Chief Justice

159. These were the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) (i.e., General MacArthur)
and the two houses of the Japanese Diet.
160. See generally Takeyoshi Kawashima, Dispute Resolution in Contemporary Japan, in LAW IN
JAPAN: THE LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 41 (Arthur Von Mehrem ed., 1963) (classic cultural
explanation); John Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. JAPANESE STUD. 359 (1978)
(institutional explanation); Mark J. Ramseyer, Reluctant Litigant Revisited: Rationality and Disputes in
Japan, 14 J. JAPANESE STUD. 111 (1988) (institutional explanation); Takao Tanase, The Management of
Disputes: Automobile Accident Compensation in Japan, 24 L. & SOC’Y REV. 651 (1990) (political
explanation).
161. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Feb. 1, 1950, Sho 23 (re) no. 141, 4-2 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 73 (Japan) (holding that not only the Supreme Court but all lower courts have the
power of judicial review); see Matsui, supra note 5, at 1379 (discussing limited judicial review).
162. Since its foundation in 1955, the LDP has been in power continuously, except for 1993–94 and
2009–12.
163. See Tushnet & Dixon, supra note 35, at 113–14 (for another account that also emphasizes the
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to recommend replacements, the recommendations—if accepted—are
usually of those not expected to be a source of concern or independentminded action.164 As noted above, by appointing justices at a relatively
advanced age, usually only five or six years before their mandatory
retirement, LDP prime ministers have further enhanced their political control
and manipulation of the SCJ. To the extent the system seeks independentmindedness on legal/constitutional issues, it is mostly conducted within the
executive branch by the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB), an expert source
of legal counsel broadly modeled on the Conseil d’État in France.165 The
CLB has largely displaced the SCJ as the primary interpreter of the
Constitution, for the SCJ usually defers to its view, perhaps reflecting a
larger political/legal cultural preference for bureaucratic professionalism
rather than judicial power.
In sum, on paper, the textual provisions establishing and empowering
the SCJ provide little basis for predicting its actual position in the Japanese
constitutional system. Although its conservatism can be exaggerated, neither
its own judicial practice nor constitutional practice more broadly afford it a
particularly consequential role in the resolution of significant issues. This
overall weakness of the SCJ stems from the juxtaposition of the relatively
low status of the ordinary judiciary with decentralized judicial review, and
especially from the political context of a dominant party without
constitutional or other effective protection for impartial judicial
appointments, rather than lack of legal powers or deliberate design choice.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that the proper measure of the power of a
constitutional court is its consequential nature as an institutional actor in
terms of constitutional and policy outcomes, relative to the other institutional
actors in that polity. Although more diffuse and harder to quantify, this
conception of judicial power is more inclusive and realistically nuanced than
commonly employed uni-dimensional alternatives such as international
influence or strike-down rate. The consequential nature of a constitutional
court is a function of three broad categories or types of variable: formal rules
and powers; legal and judicial practice; and the immediate political context
in which it operates. Through a process of mutual interaction, each of these
importance of the dominant position of the LDP in understanding—functionally—”weak-form” judicial
review in Japan).
164. See Law, supra note 5, at 1550−51 (discussing recommendations by the Chief Justice).
165. Sometimes the government does not seek an independent view, as when it essentially bypassed
the CLB in order to “reinterpret” Article 9 as permitting collective self-defense by Cabinet resolution in
July 2014.
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three helps to shape and constitute the more specific components of a court’s
institutional power, which include the nature, scope, and content of the
constitution it enforces, the jurisdictional and remedial powers it has and
employs, the ease or difficulty of constitutional amendment, and its
composition and tenure. As we have seen, following Brinks and Blass,166
these multiple components of judicial power can usefully (although
somewhat underinclusively) be grouped into autonomy and authority, but the
extent of a constitutional court’s autonomy and authority is the product of all
three broad categories.
Sometimes a particular factor that helps to shape the extent of a
constitutional court’s autonomy or authority—and hence its power—also
helps to explain it. For example, the LDP’s ability as a dominant party to
control appointments to the SCJ both reduces its autonomy and partly
explains its weakness as a constitutional court. Here, political context
overlaps as both an evidentiary and an explanatory factor, so there is
certainly no watertight, mutually exclusive division between the two. But,
as we have seen, legal culture also contributes a separate, more wholly
explanatory reason for the weakness of the court and the infrequent use of
its powers. Moreover, the role of politics is not always as direct and
immediate, so as to enhance or reduce the power of a court, but is frequently
more genuinely contextual and explanatory in terms of creating or limiting
opportunities and political space for a constitutional court. Measurement and
explanation are more fully and uniformly distinct tasks when we ask, not
about why a constitutional court fails to use or rarely uses its granted powers
(as this also implicates the extent of its autonomy/authority and whether it
can be considered a powerful court), but such questions as, for example, why
a given court’s power has changed over time. The broad categories of
explanatory factors suggested are deliberate constitutional design choices,
legal culture, and more general political context.
This Article has the fundamentally second-order goal of helping to
advance and refine a framework for thinking about the cluster of issues that
involve or engage with notions of the power or strength of constitutional
courts. As such, and notwithstanding its two case studies, it necessarily
paints with a broad brush. If it succeeds in moving the ball forward at all,
this will be through future fine-grained studies that, by telling us more about
either particular (evidentiary or explanatory) factors or particular courts, fill
in more of the details of the picture sketched here.

166. See Brinks & Blass, supra note 4, at 296 (describing their three-dimensional framework of ex
ante autonomy, ex post autonomy, and authority).

